Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Herbert Wolfe, Shirley Wolfe, Elliott Wolfe, Kayla
Wolfe, and Merrill Strong under Wolfe's
Department Store v. Sarah White and James L.
White : Reply Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wolfe et al v. White et al, No. 7153 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/824

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
HUBERT \YOLFE, SHIRLEY 'VOL:F,~J,
his wife, ELLIOTT vVOLFE, KA YLA
WOLFE, and ~IERRILL STRONG, Copartners, doing business under the fir1n
narne and stvle of \VOLFE'S DEPART~IENT STORE and WOLF£ 'S DEP ART11 EXT STORE, a copartnership.
Plai-ntiffs and Appellatnls,

Case No.
715'3

vs.

SARAH WHITE and JA~fES L. \VHITE,
her husband,
Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAIN·TIFFS
AND APPELLANTS

CO~fMENTS

ON ''RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT
OF CASE" (Page 1)

Respondents have made their own statement of the
case although plaintiffs' and appellants' ''Statement of
Facts'' contains the lease in full, the complaint with
amendments, bill of particulars and exhibits in full. Because we felt that it would he more convenient for the
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court if each Inetnber of the court had before him thP
documents in their enthety, we made no attempt to
abridge the documents. An abridgement also is apt to
present incompletely the actual story that should be disclosed. This is quite evident from the staternent of the
case in respondents' brief. He>spondents set forth paragraphs 3, 6, 8 and 11 with eertain portions of them
italicized and do not refer to other paragraphs or provisions of the lease that are significant and of controlling
importance. For instance respondents leave out paragraph 5 which shows that the plaintiffs (lessees) actually had no rights or obligations under the lease and as
to them there really was no lease until June 7, 1946, even
though the lease is dated February ,-19, 1945, for a term
eommencing :March 7, 1945. Aetually plaintif~s' term was
only from June 7, 1946, to and including ~iay 31, 1956,
which term if' spoken of throughout the lease as "the
last ten years of this lease.·· There were the first 15
months covered hy the lease during which the defendants
(lessors) had obligation~' under thP lease, but during
whieh period plaintiffs had no rights or obligations.
Also in their abridgement of th~ complaint defendleave out many things that are actually pres·ent anrl
which should be included if a fair and adequate stateant~

ment

i~

to he presented. On page 5 of respondents' brief

on the first line the last word should be ''erection'' instead of ''construction.'' Further down on the page re~pondents

in stating the contents of the Building Code

(·onfine their attention to Sec. 301, whereas the complaint
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gives the substance of all the sections referred to ther~:.. ·
in. The complaint calls attention to the fact that the provisions of the Code authorized the condemnation of any
building or portion thereof found to be dangerous or un,safe or which violate the provisions of the Code ''due to
deterioration or other defects.'' The quoted language is
not included in respondents' statement nor do respond. ents call attention to the fact that in addition to prohibiting the building condemned to be occupied the Code
also prohil;>its it to be "used for: any purpose." Nor do
defendants in their statement include the allegations of
the complaint that they refused to take any action whatsoever to put the roof in good condition and that ·plain:.
tiffs were excluded from possession of the premises because of the condition of. the roof. Nor do they call attention to the allegations of the complaint that plaintiffs repeatedly notified defendants that if def·endants
did not take some steps to put the roof in good c~:Q.di...,
tion and to meet the requirements of the public authori:..
ties plaintiffs would be compelled. to do so and hold de-;
fendants liable therefor. Nor do the defendants point out
that the complaint alleges that while a new roof was put
on much of the old roof was salvaged and used in the
new roof and that while steel beam construction was
used that that was as cheap or ·cheaper than 'lumber and
that at that time only green lumber was obtainable at
a cost higher even than steel. Nor do they call attention
to the fact that plaintiffs expressly eliminated from
their claim for damages any charges that could be questioned as being excessive. Actually the complaint alleges
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that the Building ·Code specifies that if a building or
portion thereof is dangerous or unsafe due to deterioration or other defects it shall not be occupied or used for
any pur·pose until it has been made safe; that defendants'
attention was called not only to the r·equirements of the
Building Inspector but also to thP fact that actually and
aside fron1 the Building Inspector's opinion the roof was
unsafe; that defendants refused not only to comply with
the Building Inspector's requirements but r·efused to do
anything at all with reference to the roof, and that as a
result thP plaintiffs were excluded from occupying the
premises for the purposes for which they were leased to
them; that plaintiffs told defendants that if they didn't
fix the roof plaintiffs would do it and hold them responsible: that Plaintiffs did fix it as cheaply as they
could and salvaged and used all they could of the e:xisting materials in their construction work. St,eel construction was not used as indicated hy respondents. The
steel was used in the steel beams.
Respondents' break-down of the leas·e agreement
into paragraphs a, b, (' and d on pages 6 and 7 of their
brief does not reflect the actual or controlling provisions
of the lease at all.
There is in the lease no such unqualified acceptance
of the premises as counsel would indicate. Paragraph
6 nmst be construed in connection with the other provisions of the lease, particularly those of paragraph 3,
5, 8 and 18. This

j:-;

also 'true of paragraph 11. One phrase

of one paragraph cannot be singled out as the eontrolling
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provision of the lease and construed alone without any
reference to re1uaining provisions of the lease explanatory of and applicable to such phrase. There is no period
as indicated on page o of defendants brief (a), after
the words ''accept said pre1nises in the condition and
state of repair they are now in.'' Our acceptance of the
premises was qualified and the roof was expressly excepted. The ren1aining portion of paragraph 6 clearly
shows when construed with the other provisions of the
lease that the lessees assmned no responsibility for any
of the pre1nises until June 7, 1946. Up to that time under
paragraph 5 the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the
pre1nises and had no rights and no obligations. For the
period preceding June 7, 1946, and for the remaining ten
years of the lease the lessors under the ·exception in
·paragraph 6 and under paragraph 8 had all the obligations with reference to the roof. For the last ten years
of the lease the lessees agreed only that all improvements, upkeep and repairs of every kind and nature
whatsoever, etc., ''except as hereinafter stated,'' were
to be made at their expense. This did not include any
structural changes which were expressly excluded as
their responsibility and they were forbidden to do then1
under paragraph 3, nor the roof by reason of paragraph
8. It is obvious that the lessees for the first 15 months
of the lease had no obligation whatever concerning any
of the premises. That was the obligation of the lessor.
For the last ten years of the lease if ''improvements,
upkeep and repairs, of every kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent thereof, and whether the
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Harne be ordinary or extraordinary, and regardless of
how the same may be necessitated.'' were required for the
1·oof they were expressly excluded by the lease terms
front the obligation of the plaintiffs. By the termH of
paragraph 8 and by exclusion from paragraph 6 the
roof at all times was the obligation of the lessors.
On page 7 of their brief under paragraph B defendants purport to quote the provisions of paragraph 6.
Their quotation, however, leaves out and overlooks five
commas which are found in paragraph 6 of the lease.
In the lease itself the phrase, "except as hereinafter
stated,'' ref.ers to everything that precedes the phrase.
It is separated from the remainder of the paragraph 'by
eomma~. 1n defendants' quotation it would appear that
the words, ''except as hereinafter stated,'' modified the
words, ''and i·egardless of how the fo'ame may b€> necessitated.'' That is not the way the paragraplt reads.
When construed in connection with the remaining provision~ of the lease it is clear from the lease itself,
that in addition to the other matters recited, the lessees
accept~d the premises in the condition and state of repair they are now in, ''except as hereinafter stated.''
J1~xpressed

the

another way, under the language of the lease

premise~

were accepted hy the lessees

onl~'

upon the

('ondition that the lessors for the entire terrn would keep
the roof in good condition and repair. Lessor .James L.
vVhite drafted and composed the lease. When he put the
words in the lease that he would keep the roof in good
condition and repair, he then•hy represented that it was
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in good condition at the tiine the preiniseH were m~
cepted. He also agreed further that if at any time during the entire tenn, including the 15 1nonths when lesseeH
were out of possession, the roof was not in good condition, defendants would be required to keep it in good
condition. We have already on page 41 of our original
brief given the definition of the words ~'to keep,'' '·roof''
and ·'good condition.'· These definitions were not disputed by defendants, and under these definitions .the
lessors agreed to maintain and preserve fr01n risk or
danger from the beginning to the end, the cover of the
building including the roofing and all the materials and
construction necessary to carry and maintain the same
upon the walls or other uprights, in a reasonably safe
condition, sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes.
However, "to keep" and "good condition" hav,e such
common meanings that the words speak for themselves.
"To keep" means "to maintain" and "good condition"
means good condition, not dangerous or unsafe condition or in such a condition that· the premises cannot
be occupied or used. It is grotesque to assert that under
this lease defendants had no responsibility for a roof that
was so inadequate and unsafe as to prohibit the use of
the premises which they leased to the plaintiffs for. ten
years.
With reference to paragraph D (paragraph 11 of the
lease) on page 7 of defendants' brief, the lease itself
shows that that paragraph only exempted the lessors
from liability for plaintiffs' failure to keep the premises
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in repair. Paragraph 11 when construed with the rest of
the lease exempts the lessors front liability for failure
of the lesees to perform their obligations. Paragraph 11
does not exentpt dependants for their failure ''to keep the
roof in good (•ondition.'' We shall refer to this paragraph
later.
DEFENDAN1,S' "ARGUMENT'' ON PAGE I

Throughout their brief defendants do as the~· did
In the lower court_. The~· assume that all they were required to do was to keep the roof in repair. According
to the defendants the lease reads: ''Lessees accept the
premises in the condition and state of repair they are
now in, so for the entire terrn of this lease the lessors
shall have the obligation only to keep the roof of the
leased premises in the same condition a~ it now i:.;, even
though it is or becomes dangerou~ and unsafe.'' That il-'
the effect of the defendants' argument. That, however, is
not what the lease says. We accepted the premises in
the condition they were then in only upon defendants'
express pron1ise that so far as the roof was concerned it
would be maintained by them in a safe and proper eondHion at all times both before we took poss-ession and
afterwards. Defendants, themselves also defined the extent of their obligation in paragraph 6 by stating that
all irnprovements, upkeep and repairs, regardless of how
the same may be necessitated, and regardless of the extent thereof, whether ordinary or extra-ordinary did not
apply to the roof. \V e were to do none of those thingH
to or for the roof. Those were defendants' obligation~.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
.And it was only with this understanding that we accepted
the premises.
Defendants discuss the lease as though the words
··in good condition~' were not in it. The fact that the
words "in good condition'' are used and that the word
··repair'' is also used clearly indicate that they refer
to different things. ''Good condition'' means something
different than ''repair,'' or the words would not have
been used. The parties 1neant that something other than
mere repairs were to be done by the lessors. The defendants' obligations with reference to the roof were just
as extensive as were plainti;fs' obligations for other
matters under paragraph 6.

DEFENDANTS' ARGU.\fENT ON

PAGJ1~

9

Defendants on page 9 and the following pages up to
page 23 argue that they were only obligated to make ordinary repairs to the roof. They cite many cases on this
point. Cases dealing merely with the obligation to repair
have no application to this case. Be that as it may, many
of the cases cited by defendants if applied to the facts
here would be directly opposed to the theory asserted by
defendants. For instance on page 9 defendants cite St.
Joseph, etc. vs. St. Louis, et1c., 36 S.W. 602. In that case
the plaintiff leased its railroad to the Wabash Railroad.
Wabash agreed to put the road in such condition that
it could be operated efficiently. Wabash did not do this
and sublet to the defendant who only agreed to deliver
up the property in the same good order and repair as it
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was in at the tin1e of the subleting. The pl~intiff tried to
hold the defendant for the breach committed by Wabash.
rrhe defendant itself had _greatly improved the road, but
the lease had been broken and violated before defendant
took possession. The court said that the sub-lessee was
not liable for the prior breach and was only required to
rnaintain the road in the same condition it was in when
it took it. The referee, however, to whom the case was
referred in the beginning stated that if W abaRh had
been the defendant he would have found for the plaintiff. Applying the rule of that case to the case at bar,
the defendants agreed that for the 15 mbnths before we
went into possession they would keep the roof in good
condition. We accepted the premises in reliance upon
this promise. They did not do so. The lease was breached
before we went into possession. Defendants cite on page
9 excerpts from 36 C.J. and 32 Am .•Jur. These authorities
must be considered in connection with the entire subject
under discussion and in connection with the cases supporting the text. Fot instance 36 C .•J. 142, the same page
referred to by defendants, also states, ''A covenant b~,
the landlord to repair and to keep in repair * "" * obligates
him to put thr premises in repair if out of repair at the
time of the rnaking of the lease." This rule applied to
our case makes defendants' liability elear. And 'in the
next subdivision, 781, it states that the duty of the tenant
to make repairs does not include structural changes or
unforeseen building alterations required by publie
authorities, even though the tenant had agreed in the
lease to make repairs. We not only had not agreed to
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n1ake
do so.

repair~

to the roof, but defendants had agreed to

~\t one or two places in their brief defendants by
innuendo infer that we were probably required under
paragraph 3 to take care of the roof if it was in such
a condition as to require nwre than mere patching up.
The plain language of paragraph 3 is that we were to
make permanent improvements which were in the main
to consist of a new front. The cost of the improvements
was not to be less than $10,000.00 but could be more. "rhe
fact that the figure $10,000.00 was used shows that it
was approxnnately that amount that the parties had in
mind that the lessees should add to the permanent value
of defendants' building. It woUld be beyond reason to
assert that the parties 'had in mind that the $10,000.00 to
be spent by plaintiffs in adding to the value of the defendants property meant al~o a new roof for the place,
and pa'rticularly if the new roof was required because
the premises were actually unfit to be used at all.

Defendants argue that convenants to keep in repair
and to keep in as good repair as they .now are amount to
the same thing. What of it~ That proposition is not involved here. They then repeat and repeat the same thing
over and over again, and over and over again assert that
that is all they were required to do because we accepted
the premises in the condition they were then in. The
meaning of the words ''to keep in repair,'' and the meaning of the words ''to keep in as good repair as they now
are'' are not the test here, although as just seen from
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36 C .•J., supra, ''to keep in repair," Ineans to put in
1·epair if out of repair. Neither phrase, however, defines
the defendants' obligations under this lease.
A brief review of the cases relied upon by defendants
will he sufficient to indicate that they do not justify any
holding in favor of the defendants under the facts present
in the casP at bar. vVe shall spend little time on those
cases that invol~e only the obligation to keep in repair
or in as good repair as at the time when the premises
were leased since the~· have no application here. Therefor, commencing with page 10 of defendants' brief we
find the case of Farr' vs. Wasatch Chemical Company,
105 Utah 272, 143 Pac. (2) 281. This case we have already
discussed at pages 43 and 54 of our first brief, and we
shall later refer to it herein in connection with the contention of defendants that evidence under some of the
allegations of our complaint would violate the parol evidence rule with reference to written contracts. The next
case cited by defendants is on page 11 and is Nixon V:).
Gammon (Ky.) 229 S.W. 75. Defendants contend that
the lease in that case provided that the lessee should keep
the premises in good condition arnd repair. As a matter
of fact, in reciting the terms of the lease the court at
first said that the lease provided that the tenant agreed
to keep the premises in good condition of repair. However, at another p1ace in the opinion the court uses the
word ''and'' instead of ''or'' so we are unable to deterrnine which i~ the word actually expressed in the lease.
Nevertheless, in that case the landlord had agreed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IS
make extraordinary repairs, and the tenant to keep the
pren1ises in such condition as to return them to the lessor
"'in as good condition a~ they now are." The court said
that the landlord's agree1nent for extraordinary repairs
did not mean rebuilding after a fire. lt also held that
the tenant was only required to keep the building in or- ·
dinary condition which did not include building a roof
or replacing property destroyed by fire. The case didn't
say who had to replace the roof which was destroyed by
fire. However, in the case at bar the lease itself ·demonstrates that the provisions of paragraph 3 and 6 defining
the plaintiffs' obligations broad as they were did not contemplate the replacement of property except as specifically enumerated. Parag1~aph 18 provides that if the
premises are destroyed entirely at any time the lease shall
terminate, but •' In the event that said premises are
rendered untenable by fire or the elements, Lessors agree
to repair and restore said premises with r·easonable dispatch. In case of such repairs the rent due hereunder
shall abate during the making of the same." Clearly the
parties to this lease did not contemplate that the lessees
had any such obligations as defendants now try to infer.
Paragraph 18 provides that if the premises are rendered
untenable by the elements the lessors shall repair and
restore them. The lessors also define their obligation to
''restore'' the premises as ''repairs.'' Defendants thenl8elves have indicated by the lease that the word "repairs'' is far broader than their counsel now insist i:;
the meaning of the word. If the Nixon case is of any
value to the court, it is only for the reason that it in-
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dicates that the word ''repairs'' does cover ''ordinary
wear and tear of the building and its decay." The complaint herein expressly alleges that the roof sagged and
became worse as time went on, and if defendants agreed
only to repair the roof, (which they did not) they were
·bound even under that case or under any of the others
cited hy defendants to take care of what resulted from
ordinary wear and tear and decay. The complaint expressly alleges that the roof commenced to sag after the
lease was entered into and the sagging became worse;
that it was unsafe at the time the lease was entered into
an(l became progressively worse. {p. 25 our brief) So
even under the contention that defendants were only required to make repairs the complaint iR invnnerable.
However, it is not necessary to place this case upon any
narrow ground because the defendants did not agree only
to keep the roof in ordinary repair or in the same repair
al-' when the lease was entered into.
On page 12 of their brief defendants 1nake several
m~sertions that are' inexcusable. It may be that they were
carelessly made, but inasmuch as they purport to recite
the terms of the lease it is difficult to overlook the fact
that the statements are not true. Defendants say that we
''agreed to make all 'improvements' and all extr.aordimnry repairs of whatsoever kind or character and regardleHl-' of the nature and extent thereof ·and hoU'f1H->r neaes-

·"·it.aterl) ". There is no qualification whatsoever in the
brief to that statement and it is absolutely untrue. The
dpfendant~

continue: · ''while LesRors, under the con-
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struction placed upon the language of the lease by the
Kentucky court, agreed to u1ake only ordinary repairH
to the roof, which the lessees had accepted.'' The first
stateinent elin1inates all punctuation found in paragraph
6 of the lease and leaves out the words contained therein
after ••however necessitated" which words are "except
as hereinafter stated." vVhile in the second statement
defendants assert that under the lease they were required · •to n1ake only ordinary repairs to the roof.'' The
lease sa~·s no such thing. Then defendants argue: ''Can
it with reason be contended that the obligation to keep
an accepted roof in good condition and repair obligated
the lessor to destroy the roof and the understructure support thereof and substitute one of steel beam construction? Would not such a substitution be an 'improvement'
, or an 'extraordinary .repair' within the obligation of the
lessees?'' Those statements alone demonstrate the conlplete-ly false position created by the defendants. Regarding the last statement, we neither destroyed the roof and
the understructure support, nor did we accept the roof
and agree that a~l defendants had to· do was keep it in
the same condition it was in. If what we did was an "inlprovement" or" an extraordinary repair" as defendants
imply, then the defendants definitely were' obligated by
paragraph 6 alone to do the work, because paragraph 6
eliminated, by the exception contained therein, our obligation to make any improvements or extraordinary repairs of the excepted property. Under their own con~
struction, as to the excepted property, they had the same
obligations as we did for that not excepted. Defendants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
(•,ontinue: ''There is no allegation in the complaint that
the ~roof as accepted ever beca1ne out of repair." \Ve have
already called the court's attention to the allegations of
the cmnplaint which, of course, this court can read for
itself, and particularly those found on page 25 of our
fin~t brief. If as defendants imply on page 13 the roof
was unsafe from the beginning, certainly it would be
more unsafe fifteen months later when we were to go
into possession.
On page 13 defenda-nts cite Kingsted us. Wright, 133
N. vV. 399. Lessors' covenants in that case were not the
sarne as in the case at bar. The case holds that the lessors'
covenants to keep in repair did not impose the duty to
nmke improvernents or betterments. Under paragraph 6
of our lease we believe that the exception required the
lessors to do the same thing with reference to the excepted property as we were required to do with that not
Pxcepted and that under paragraph 8 the lesson;;' duty
was Pven greater. When all paragraphs of the lease are
construed together including paragraph 18, it is ·obviou~ that so far as the roof is concerned even if entirely rebuilding it was involved that obligation was the
obligation of the lessors.
At the bottom of page 13 defendants state: "There
a studious avoidance by appellanti-' of the phrast•
·keep in good condition a.nd repair' as used in the lease.''
In ·view of what we said in our first brief and what we
have so far said in this brief, that statement is ludicrous.
We are the ones who have emphasized and ernphasized
l~
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again the words ··keep in good condition and repair.'' 1t
is the defendants who have avoided them by leaving
out the words ••good condition and.'' Then at the top
of page 14 defendants assert that 32 Am. Jur. pages
673-4 points out that these terms express entirely different obligations. That is just what we have been arguing. To keep in good condition is entirely different
than to keep in repair. However, in reading the citations
from C. J. and An1. Jur. as we have already pointed out,
it is necessary to read the complete citations on the subject being considered. Excerpts, with ommissions front
the text, sometimes convey an entirely different meaning than that actually stated in the text.
The next case cited by defendants, Cadman vs. ByGrade Food Products Corpo.ration, (Mass.), 33 N. E.
(2) 759, we do not find in either volume of 33 N. E. either
the first or second edition. However, we could agree in
considering the parol evidence rule in our case with the
statement attributed to that case by defendants on page
15: "The phrases 'Vn. g'ood tenable nepair' and in 'good
condition' appearing in such lease do not have a fixed or
technical meaning which is always the same regardless of
the charaeter or use of the building to which they refer.·'
However, we have not read the case and do not know what
it holds. We do know, however, that we did not accept an
unsafe and dangerous roof. If there was any representation with reference to the roof, it was defendants' representation that at the time of the lease it was in good condition. Certainly, they agr,eed that when we .took possession in June of 1946 it would be in good condition because
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they agreed that for the entire term of the lease they
would keep it in that condition. It was not in good condition when we were to take over under the lease and defendants had not kept it in good condition for the fifteen
month~ prior to our occupancy.
ngFJ1~NDANTH' CONrrENTJON THAT '' Lli~S80H~
OBLIGATED TO _MAKE ONLY ORDINAfiY RF~
PAIR~ TO THE HOOF" (Page 16)

\Vhat we have already said in our original brief and
In this brief, we think answers defendants' arguments
<·ommencing at page Hi and ending at page 23. It might
he added, however, that the complaint sets forth the construction that defendants placed on the lease they drew,
(which construction we believe was correct) and that
they did make special covenants and stipulations with
regard to the roof. The lessors did not as defendants'
<"onnsel now contend make' only a general covenant, and
the lessees a larger covenant. The lessees' covenant contains an exception which exception is as broad as the
covenant from which it is excluded and is amplified by
paragraph 8. Defendants argue that we did more than
,the~! were required to do because we removed an entire
roof and supporting structure constructed of wood and
substituted therefor one of steel beam construction. The
complaint and the bill of particulars show that we used
all the old materials from the original roof it was p,ossible
to use; that steel beam construction was cheaper at that
tirne than lumber and also that the only kind of lumber
ohtainahle was green and unsuitable for use in roofs;
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that 60% or Inore of the old Inaterial in the roof was used
in the work of fixing the roof and that we eliminated frmn
our costs anything that 1nade the roof more expensive
than actually replacing what formerly existed. (Bill of
Particulars, •brief 33-34) However, what we did was
only what was necessary and required by the public
authorities. If to have a roof in good condition required
us to do what we did, then the roof could not be kept in
good condition without the doing of what we did.
It would unduly extend this brief, now already too
long, to discuss in detail every case cited by defendants,
but there is one case cited by them, Lurcolt1t vs. Wakely,
(1911), 1 K. B. 905, that does need special attention-not
because of what defendants have said concerning it, but
because of what they have failed to say. Actually the
principles announced in that case when applied to the
case at bar are decidedly against the defendants. We
wonder if they actually read the case. In that case the
tenant agreed to well and substantially repair and keep
in thorough repair and good condition aH of the premises
demised. The lease ran for a great many years. One of
the walls 'because of age became unsafe. To repair it required that it be rebuilt. The court said that under the

aforesaid covenants of the tenant it was the tenant's
duty to rebuild the wall. If the entire house had become
unsafe, the duty to make it safe was that of the landlord.
There are three o-pinions in the case. One by CozensHardy, M. R.; ·one by Fletcher Moulton, L. J.; and one·
by Buckley, L. J. Defendants'

quotatio~

is from the
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op1mon by Lord. Buckley. But even defendants' quotation is against them as appears merely from reading it.
'"fhe quotation given by defendants is not complete. The
complete quotation on the subject under discus~ion inclurling that omitted is as follows:
''A roof falls out of repair~ the necessary
work is to replace decayed timbers hy sound wood;
to substitute sound titles or slatef-! for thoRe which
are cracked, broken or missing; to make good the
flashings, (defendants called these flushings), and
the like.'' (The following is omitted by defendants :) ''Part of a garden wall tumbles down; repair is affected by building it up again with new
mortar, and so far as necessar:v, new bricks or
stone. Repair is restoration by renewal or replacement of subsidiary parts of a whole. Renewal as distinguished from repair, is reeonstruction of the entirety, meaning by the entirety not
necessarily the whole hut substantially the whole
subjeet matter under discussion.'' (The defendants' quotation then eontinues:) ''I agree that if
repair of the whole subject matter has become impossible a covenant to repair does not carry an
obligation to renew or replace.''
However, this judge as well as the other two hold that
under the tenant's covenants he had to rebuild the wall,
hut if the whole house had needed rebuilding that would
have been the obligation of the landlord. Applying these
principles to the case at bar, had the roof fallen down
''repair is affected by building it up again.'' Certainly,
it cannot be contended that we were required to wait
until the roof fell in on us, nor tha.t had the roof fallen in
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on u~ defendants then and not until then, would han· been
required to build it up again; that tlwy coi1ld wait until it actually fell in before that dut~· devolved upon them.
rrhere i~ no principle with whieh "'e are familiar that
would justify any ~uch nonsen~e. 1'ht> judge~ dit-H·ussed
another and earlier case to this efft::>et: \Yhere the tenant
had agreed to keep the prenlis<-'~ in good tenantable repair · •if tlw floor bec01ne rotten, the tenant must put
in a new floor unles~ he e.an rnake the floor good h~· ordinary repair. The floor was a subsidian· part of the
whole. The house could not be occupied if the floor were
rotten, and the tenant to comply with l1is covenant as to
tenantable repair, n1ust either ·1nake it good hy repair or
replace it. for otherwise the house would not be tenantable ... In our case if the roof bee-arne unsafe the landlord must put in a ne,,· roof unless he can make the roof
safe by ordinary repair. The premises could not be occupied if the roof were unsafe, and the landlord to comply
with his covenant to keep in good condition must either
make the roof good by repair or replace it, otherwise
the roof would not be in good condition. We make this
analogy because of the construction another judge in
that case placed upon the words ''thorough repair.'' In
that case since the wall could not be repaired without rebuilding it the court held it must be rebuilt. In the deci~ions is found this language : ''It is only repair in the
~en:.;e that it is restored to stability and safety a suborrlinate part of the whole.'' Applying the. principles of
that case to our case: even had there been here no cove.
nan.t on the part of the landlord and had the roof become
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so unsafe as to require replacing of the whole, the re-:
building would have been the obligation of the landlord
because we made no covenant to replace or rebuild anything. The English court holds that if renovating or renewing or repairing requires the rebuilding of the whole
that obligat1on falls upon the landlord and not the tenant.
In the ·case at bar, however, the landlord specifically
agreed to keep the whole roof in good condition. Lord
Fletcher Moulton's opinion is very helpful in our case. He
used this language: ''The words are a description of
a state and not a mode by which 'that state is arrived
at, and therefore, in my own mind I draw no wide
distinction between keeping in thorough repair and
keeping in good condition; they both appear to nie
to describe the condition of the house.'' He also said:
''I think that to keep in thorough repair does not in any
way .confine the duty of the person who is liable under
the covenant to the doing of what are ordinarily called
repairs.'' This judge defined the words ''keep in good
condition" to be the same as "keep in thorough repair.''
He said they were not the same as ''what are ordinarily
called repairs. ' ' H·e also said : '.'If a house is in such
a condition so that it is dangerous to the public, and that
a portion of it has to be pulled down and rebuilt at the
demand of the authorities on the ground of public safety
-which must be the safety of the people within as well
as without-,-there is a plain breach of the covenant to
keep in good condition.'' This judge not only says ''good
condition'' is different from ''ordinary repairs'' but
also says that if a thing is dangerous and unsafe and
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must bt> repla(•ed at thP demand of tlw puhlie autlwritiP~,
it i~ not in good condition.
Ht>fPrring now to three uwre of def(mdant:::; ea~t>:-;,
rs. RuthenlJilrg, 1:~1 ~.\Y. :~f>l;
W<~Jh:r 1·~. Cos_o.rore. (Ky. l~l2;->), :273 H.vV. -1:>0, and
JJwight rs. Ludlou· Jlfg. Co., (.:\la~:::;.) 128 .l\Iass. 280, 282:
In Tralke1· rs. Cosgrore the tenant agreed to take good
earp of the pro-perty and pay for ordinary repairs. A
<lrain wa~ in poor condition when he took possession.
Tlw ease only holds thaf hi:::; obligation \\·as to umke repairs that resulted from his use. Of course, that case has
no application here. Actually that ease involved an attPmpt by the landlord to raise the tenant's rent, and the
court recognized that the repair feature injected by the
landlord was si1nply a subterfuge to compel the tenant
either to pa~· increased rent or to get out. The D'wight vs.
L'udlmc case is really an authority for us. AH we are asking in the case at bar is what the court required to be
done in that case. All we are asking is that· defendant restore the roof so that it would be capable of doing wh~t
it did after its original construction. So far as appears
in the case at bar the original roof as originally con-

P~<l Anw~ement C'o.

:-;tructed was adequate. It apparently passed the building inspector then, but when we went to take possession
it was in such a condition as to be unsafe and inadequate.
'Vl1en it reached that condition, no one knows, nor do
Wp

know whether building requirements had changed;

whether the roof was inadequate because of the strain put
npon it hy time, or for what reason. All we know is what
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the building inspector told us and what was actually di~
closed when we went to work on the roof. The building
inspector said it was unsafe and we could not occupy the
premises in that condition. Actually the roof proved to
be unsafe as disclosed when we went to work on it. Regardless of what else it holds, 'the case of Plaza Amusement Company vs. Rothlevnberg, holds that the lessee wa~
not required to 1nake structural changes regardless of
the provisions of his lease with reference to keeping the
preinises in as good order and eondition as when leased;
That case also holds that the parties must be assumed
not to have intended to violate the law. In our lease it
is expressly provided by paragraph 7 that we will occupy the premises in a lawful manner. We could not occupy them in a lawful manner and disregard the building
inspector.
Defendants say (brief p. 21): "Counsel realize that
they are on narrow footing if they must rely on the lease
itself, so they assert that it is alleged in the complaint
* * *," etc. They then quote rules of law from which
there is no dissent that parol evidence cannot vary the
terms of a written contract. We rely on the terms of the
lease. But, also, the complaint alleges that defendant
James L. White drew the lease and that upon discussing
it with the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe he represented to Mr.
Wolfe that under the lease plaintiffs had no responsibility for the roof and that the provisions of the lease with
respect to accepting the premises did not apply to the
roof; that t:re roof was the sole responsibility of the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendants: tl1at plaintiffs would hav(-' no n'sptm~ibility
what.Pver for the roof. \Ye b(-'liPY(-' that l\1 r. White eorrectly advi~t>d .\I r. \Yolft~ and that tlw leasl~ does l'Xcwtly
what he said it did. ln spite of the eontention~ to tlw t'Olltrary by .\lr. \Vhite ·~ eounsel WP believp that he told
.\I r. \f olfe the truth. However, the lo\ver l'onrt took the
interpretation of the defendants' eounsel and construed
the lease to nwan ~Oinething different than in our judgment it aetually does 1nean. \Y <' did not believe ·and we
do not now believe that any a1nendn1ent to the complaint
wa:- n(-'eessary. \Ye believe that the lease sa,vs exactly
what .\I r. \Vhite represented it to sa~·. However, because
the lower court took the other view, it becmne material
to allege the interpretation placed upon the lease by the
person who drew it. This i~ not evidence to vary the
terms of a written contract by parol. vVe think that the
case of Farr ·vs. Wasatch Chemical Company) 105 Utah,
272, 143 Pae. (2) 281, supra, is authority for some of the
amendn1ents to the complaint. The principle therein announced is the same as expressed and enlarged by Williston in his latest work on "The Law of Contracts," the
Revised :H~dition in 1938, at Sec. 629 under the heading
'' Hurrounding circumstances may always be shown.''
Under defendants' argument the lease to say the least
is arnbiguous. Under all authorities any ambiguity will
hP resolved against the lessor and particularly where he
is thP one who drew the lease. The lea-se will be construed against him. However, the amendments to the
complaint
upon the

mere]~·
]pasP

atternpt to show the interpretation put

by the parties before it was ever signed.
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It is alleged that the plaintiffs never inspected the roof
and knew nothing about its condition and that Mr. 'Vhite
assured them that they were not accepting the roof and
that the lease was clear on that point. Williston's quotes
.from a federal case as follows :
'"Che correct principle has been well summarized in a federal decision. (Eustis .Mining Co.
vs. Beer, 239 F. 976, 985) · All the attendant facts
constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so long as they are helpful; the extent of
their assistance depends upon the different nteanings which the language itself will let in. Hence
we may say, truly perhaps, that, if the language
is not ambiguous, no evidence is admisible, meaning no more than that it could not control the
Hense, if we did let it in; indeed, it might 'contradict' the contract-that is, the actual words
should be remembered to have a higher probative
value, when ·explicit, than can safely be drawn by
inference from surroundings. Yet, as all language
will bear some different meanings, some evidence
is always admissible; the line of exclusion depends on how far the words will stretch, and how
alien is the intent they are asked to include. Whatever may he the propriety of admitting ·evidence of
extrinsic facts where the meaning of the instrument is apparently clear, there is no question that
such evidence is admissible in every jurisdiction
where there is no clear apparent meaning. It must
'be kept in mind, however, that the only purpose
for which such evidence is ev,er admissible in an
action on the contract is to interpret· the writing.
So far as the evidence tends to show not the meaning of the writing but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant."
1

' '
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'l'hi~

thought i~ expressed by the Restateinent of the
Law of Contrad:-;, A1nerican Law Institute print, under
Re<>. 236 (b) :

'· 'L'h~ principal apparent purpose of the
partie:-; i~ giYen great weight in determining the
1neaning to be given to manifestations of intention or to an~- part thereof.·'
See. (d):
· •Where words or other 1nanifestations of intention bear nwre than one reasonable 1neaning
an interpretation i~ preferred which operates
nwre :-;trongly against the part~· from whom the~·
proceed, unless their use b~- him i~ prescribed by
law."
1
The following language is also found in the aforesaid
Re::;;tatement under Comments to (f) of Sec. 235:
·'Yet, as all language will bear .some different
1neanings, evidence of surroundings is always adInissible.''
·
If the contract Ineans what defendants contend it
means, then Mr. White misrepresented its meaning to
the plaintiff~, and they signed as a result of such misrepresentation. That is pleaded in the complaint as is
also that :Mr. White is estopped now to assert that the
contract mean~ what his counsel say it does. Under the
rulP in thP F'ai-r vs. Wasatch Chemical case the parties
ma~-

he said, because of defendants' present contention,

to have a <·ollateral agrement with reference to the roof,
i.P., that the roof

wa~

no obligation of plaintifft-; and
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that the writing expressly obligated defendantg to do
everything with reference to the roof. However, as already stated, we believe that the lease means exactly
\vhat we alleged Mr. White told the plaintiff Mr. Wolfe
it did mean; that is that the lessors assumed all obligations with reference to the roof and that in accepting
the premises in their present condition the roof was excluded by express language in the lease.
Defendants assert on page 23 that any staten1ent::;
that ~[r. White made after the lease were immaterial.
Any statements Mr. White made after the signing of
the lease· with reference to the roof would be a further
interpretation by him as to the meaning of the lease with
reference to the roof.
DEFENDAN·TS' ARGU:MENT THA'T "ACTS OF
BUILDING INSPECTOR Il\1POSED NO OBLIGATION ON LESSORS" (Page 23)
We have already discussed this phase of the case
in our first brief, and we .confess that we are unable to
follow defendants' argument at all. They repeat the erroneous assertions previously made that we were bound
to make all the repairs however necessitated and insinuate that the roof was our obligation if it was unsafe,
etc. The fact is that the building inspector woul~ not let
us occupy the property under the lease until the roof was
made safe. It is immaterial when it became unsafe. We
allege that as time progressed it became more unsafe
and that its condition ·became worse after the lease was
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~ntered

into. The building in~peetor ·~ letter~ clearly
indicate that the roof wa~ in had eondition, that it wa~
not in good condition. \Vhen or how the overstressing
and tl1e bowing of the rafters, trusses and girders occurred does not appear, but these eonditions did becmne
worse until they rendered the prernises untenantable at
the tirne we were to go into possession. At the top of page
26 defendants ~a~·: .. So in seeking the permit, the Lesspe:-;
intended to ntake perntanent iu1pro_vn1ents which if they
desired, could include eonstruction of a new roof of steel
beam construetion but which would have nothing at all
to do with the repair of the then existing roof.'' The
actual wording of the lease indicates how flimsy is this
argument.
Defendant~ cite three cases on page 26: Pra,tt vs.
Grafton Electric Company, (~lass.) 65 N. E. 63, Knight
V.'i. Foster) (N.C.) 79 S.E. 614, and Victor A. Harter
Realty Compan.lJ 1.:s. Lee, 132 K. Y. S. 447, to show that
they were under no obligation to comply with the orders
of the public authorities. In the Grafton case the lease
expressly provided that the lessors should not be required to make an~· repairs on the leased premises nor
to furnish any substitute in case of destruction, loss or

rlamage. The 1esseP was required at its own expense to
make all necessary repairs to the flumes, gates, bulkheads, and leased property, to keep them in proper con(lition for u:-;e. The court said that under such stipulations there was no implied covenant on the part of the
landlord to rnake repairs ordered by the public authoriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties because the gates in the Inillpond were rotten and
in need of repair. 'rhe· lessees· expressly agreed to keep
the gates in proper condition for use, and the lessors expressly agreed they would not furnish any substitute
for the gates in case of their destruction, loss or damage.
All that the court did was follow the terms of the. lease
which is all that we ask the court to do in the present
case. In the Knight case the court e:x:pressly said that
if the landlord knew that the premises were in violation
of law by disrepair, both he and the tenant would be
liable to a third person for any injury due to the defective premises, and particularly if the landlord contracts to repair the very thing which is in disrepair. The
court also said, as we say with respect to the roof in this
case, that fixing the gate was a change and not a repair,
and so the duty was upon the landlord to make it, but
liability was also upon the tenant for injuries to third
persons; that if the nuisance existed at the time of the
demise both the tenant and the landlord are liable. In
the case at bar we wished to escape this liability by
having the nuisance that existed corrected before we
went into possession. In the Harter case the lease provided that the tena.nt should comply with all the rules,
ordinances and regulations of the City Government, and
with this express provision the court said that the tenant
was required to make repairs to the building required
by orders of the municipal authorities, sho rt of a reoonstruction of the house. So that case is authority for
1

the proposition that even though the lease requires the
tenant to comply with orders of the public authorities
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h~ i~

not required to do ~o when such order~ requin.• a
recon.strudion, and that is the rule of law generally
recognized. Those c.a~e~ when applied to the ensp at bar
when• the lessors agreed to ke~p the roof in good condition, show that defendanb are the one~ who are required to con1ply with the order~ of the publi<' authorities
particularly when the reconstruetion diredly concerns
that portion of the preruis~s over "·hirh the)' assumed
tlw obligation.
The ea~e of Clark rs. r ukvn Inrt'stmen,t CoJJtpan.iJ,
14-;) Pa<_·. 624, also cited by defendants on page 26 is not
applicable to the fact8 in our case. The Supren1e Court
of 'Vashington points out that there was a statute requiring the owner to do certain things and that that
meant the owner of the business; that the statute applied to the lessee because it was the nature of t}le lessee's
hm;inesl:' that necessitated the improven1ents ~pe<'ified
by the statute. The lessor had stipulated that it should
not be required to expend any money on the premises
and the lessee had expressly agreed that it would not permit any violation of the laws of the State of Washington. None of those elements are present in the case at
har. On page 27 counsel place their own construction on
thl' ease cited by us, at page 48 of our first brief, Hera.ld Squar, Realty Company vs. SaksJ (N.Y.) 109 N.E.
;)4:>. The principle that the landlord must rnake struc-

tural <'hanges required by public authority is there announced. This court can interpret the case ·withqut us refPn1ng to it further. Of course, that is true of all the
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cases cited by either of us, but when counsel assert that
cases stand for things they do not stand for we cannot
let such a~sertions go by without comment.
On page 28 of their brief defendants say that they
had no obligation to heed the building inspector's letters.
In other words, that they could ignore the law. This
court answered the question very -effectively in the case
of Wilcox vs. Jan'ieson, 55 Utah 535, 188 Pac. 638, cited
hy U8 at page 51 of our first brief. Counsel for defendants argue that the building inspector didn't serve any
notice in writing by personal service on the lessors. That
does not affect the lessors' liability under our lease. If
Salt Lake City was attempting to inflict a punishment
for violation of the ordinance, lessors might plead lack
of service of the notice. That, however, does not affect
their civil·liability or their liability under the lease. The
building inspector's letters show and the complaint alleges that the defendants were advised repeatedly about
the unsafe condition of the roof. The building inspector
pointed out specifically what was wrong and asked for
a submission of plans to correct the condition. He did
not attempt to dictate what the details of roof construction should he. That was left to the parties. The defendants could have submitted any plan they desir,ed and any
plan that was adequate would have been approved by the
building inspector. They refused to do anything. The
building inspector set forth what must be done, and defendants refused to do anything.
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Dr~~.,J1~N DAXT~.

~\RU lT~II~~NT

THAT

"LJ:iJH~l~EH

8J1JEK TO RECOVER FOR. STRlTCTURAL IMPROV~~l\l~JNT~" (Page 31 and Breach of Covenant
of Quiet Enjoy1nent page i~-!)
Under this heading defendants argu~:· that the penuanent ilnprovements we were to umke at a eo:-;t of not
les~ than $10.000.00 rnig·ht have included the roof. The
fact that the parties used the figure $10,000.00 and
specifically stated that the permanent improvernents
shoulrl include the installation of a first-class front shows
that they did not have in mind an~-thing with reference
to the roof nor \Yith reference to improvement~ that
would run to two or three times $10,000.00. The whole
tenor of the lease including paragraph 6 indicates that
we were not to make structural improvements generally.
Paragraph 18 as well as paragraph 8 as well as general
law hold that defendants· have the liability they seek
by insinuation to impose on us. Counsel repeatedly harp
upon the fact that we used steel, in spite of the allegations of the complaint that we used the cheapest con~truction possible.
On page :i-! counsel argue that we clairn a breach of
thP covenant of quiet enjoyment. We have spent little
time on this phase of the case, but actually under the
caHe of Heywood vs. Ogden M~otor Compa;n;y, 71 Utah
-t 17, 266 Pac. 1040, cited by us at page 49 of our first

brief,

WP

were kept out of possession of the premises by

the adH of the defendants. As we recall it there was no
PXJH'P~:-;

covenant of enjoyn1ent in the Heywood case
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while in our case there is an express covenant that the
lessees ''shall and may in accordance herewith peacefully. and quietly have, hold and enjoy said demised
premises during the term hereof,'' paragraph 16 of the
lease, page 10 of our first brief. Defendants argue that
there was no violation of this covenant of the lease because there was no eviction. They cite certain authorities including 32 Am. Jur. page 231, etc. In our case
there was an actual eviction because we were unable to go
into beneficial possession when we should have done,
and there likewise was a constructive eviction because
thereafter we were deprived of the beneficial enjoyment
of the deinised preinises-by reason of acts of the defendants. It is not necessary that there be an actual physical
ouster or dispossession in order to constitute an actual
eviction. Am. Jur., supra, says: "The ancient rule of the
common rule that entry or exprulsion, or some real disturbance of the possession, was required to establish
eviction of a tenant by his landlord has been so far modified in favor of the tenant that raCt1.()al oust,er or physical '
dispossessilon is no longer necessary to constitute an
eviction." (Italics added). If the tenant. later resumes
possession, he may waive the eviction but that does not
waive the damages flowing therefrom. The authorities
are in conflict as to whether an eviction terminates the
obligations of the tenant under the lease. We had no desire to terminate our obligations but adopted the alternative available to us of fixing the roof ourselves and
holding the defendants liable thereof. The covenant of
"quiet enjoyment" is a covenant that the tenant will be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
free from aetua.l disturbance of his possession, Hnd that
he will he protectPd fro1n unlawful interferenep hy others
in enjoying the de1nisP~ premisP~. K oeber rs. Summers,
8-! "X. \Y.
sP~~ion

~)~ll.

99:2. "fhat the eity interfered with our pos-

cannot be disputed. The defendants did not pro-

teet us frmn thi~ interference nor front actual disturb~
ance of our possession. It is n1erely begging the question
t(')

sa~-

that the

cit~·

officiab did not notit\ defendants in

writing- that we could not occupy the premises unless the
roof \Va:-: made safe. In the FaiT vs. Wasatch Chernical
east>.

~upra,

this eourt says: ''The language 'keep

~aid

premises tenantable' indicates that the parties understood the warehouse would be Inade tenantable.'' So in
our lease ''The language 'keep the roof in good condition' indicates that the parties understood that the roof
would be made in good condition.·' We think the lease is
clear that it was defendants· obligation at all times to
maintain on the premises a roof in good condition. If it
is not clear frmn the lease, then oral evidence concerning the responsibility therefor, if there _is such evidence
and the cornplaint pleads that there is, Inay be offered.
W P were kept from the premises by fault of the defendants in our judgment. We have made no effort in this
<·asp to recover anything by way of damages for evic-

tion except for the damages proximately resulting front
ac·tual dispossession of the premises for the purpose for
whic-h they were leased.
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DJ£B,_b~NDANTS
FRO~I

CLAll\t rrHEY AHE
LIABILITY (Page 38)

:H~X~~~lP'P

Defendants devote several pages ( 38-43) to a discussion of paragraph 11 of the lease. Reading paragraph
11 in connection with all of the lease it is perfectly obvious that all that paragraph does is to exonerate lessors
frofll our failure to perform our obligations to ~eep the
premises in repair. Paragraph 11 is mainly devoted to
an enumeration. of damage to be caused by plumbing,
ga~, water, stea1n pipes, and from damag.e occasioned
by acts of neighboring tenants. The paragraph clearly
is not an attempt to exempt lessors from their liability
but is an exemption of lessors fro_m liability for the
acts or omissions of others. Be that as it may, the paragraph does not exempt the lessors from liability for
damage occasioned by failure ''to keep the roof in good
condition." There is no mention of that"in the paragraph.

I

Under the authorities cited by us in our original
brief even a clause such as we have here if applied to
acts or omissions of the lessor would not exempt the
landlord from liability for that portion of the pre111ises
over which he retained responsibility. But paragraph 11
of the lease does not exempt defendants from liability
for failure ''to keep the roof in good condition,'' under
the lease, or any authorities or rule.
We have already sufficiently discussed the remaining contentions of defendants' brief headed by them
"Comments on linmaterial Allegations" ( 43). As stated
above we believe the lease says exactly what Mr. White
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

told ~lr. \~~ olfl. it did say. If, however, there is any doubt
(•on(•.erning this, that doubt will he resolved against lll r.
\\~hite both for the reason that he i~ the le~sor and also
for tht:> n~ason that he is the person who d rt:>w tlw lease.
If thert:> i~ any ambignit~· or if U1ere art:> any oral representations a~ to the n1eaning of tht:> lease rnade to induce its signing·, which are different than now clairned,
or any oral agreernenb not contained in the lease, not
only may evidence be introduced to establish the facts,
but )1 r. \Vhitt:> is estopped to contend for a different
com;truction of the lease than that which he represented
to )Jr. Wolfe would be the construction placed upon it.
We cannot pass without eonunent, however, defendant~' attempt again in the dosing pages of their brief
to fasten upon us by insinuation the responsibility for
tlw roof. 'fhey again rnisquote paragraph 6 ( 45) ''regardle~~ of how the same rnay be necessitated'' and assert that
the letters of the building inspector were to require to
be done sornething "necessitated'' within our special
obligations. A~ pointed out above, the lease actually contains a cormna after the word ''necessitated'' and says,
''except a~ hereinafter stated.'' Anything necessary to
hfl donp to the roof comes within the express exception
<·ontained therein.
Defendants concede on page 46 that we had the
right to fix the roof in this language : ''Well, as soon as
their 'right ,of possession accrued,' they did actually 'go
in· while the roof 'was still in this condition' and con~tnwt

a nfJu· roof of steel beam construction and a new
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understructure. If they did not possess the right to ·do
thi~

work under the lease, frmn what s()urce did they de-

rive their authority'?" Of course, the defendants use the
foregoing language for an entirely different purpose
than that of showing that we had the right to do what
we did, but it nevertheless is a concession by defendants
of· this right, and we leave them to answer their own
question which they have not done in their brief. WP
also agree with defendants' state1nent on page 47: "If
Lessors were liable at all to construct a new roof, it is

imm~terial when the roof began to sag.''
·It is unnecessary to make further comment on the
conclusions set forth in ·eight sub-headings in the last
pages of defendants' brief.

Further comment would

merely constitute further repetition. The whole brief

i~

baseq upon the argument advanced on nearly every
page,-in fact in nearly every paragraph-that we accepted a defective roof and that they were only bound
to keep the roof in repair. Neither premise is correct,
as we have pointed out almost with the same amount of
repetition made necessary by the repeated assertions of
defendants.
The complaint herein stated a cause of action both
before and after each of the amendments. The judgment
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ing the dennu1·er to the original cmnplaint ~ (2) ~'or sustaining the d~nlUITer to paeh of the amend1nents.
Hespeetfully suhn1itted,

SHIRLEY P.

JONJiJ~

anrl

RICH & STRONG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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